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MANAGING THE WEALTH OF NATIONS:
WHAT CHINA AND AMERICA MAY
HAVE TO TEACH EACH OTHER
ABOUT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Daniel J. Morrissey*
"To get rich is glorious."
Deng Xiaoping
"The business of America is business."
Calvin Coolidge1
I. INTRODUCTION-HOMAGE TO PROFESSOR BROMBERG
USTICE Rehnquist once called Rule 10b-5 "a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn. ' 2 If that was true, no
one tended that arboreal conceit better than Professor Alan Brom-
berg. His multi-volume treatise on 10b-5 was a scholarly tour de force
that I often consulted as a young securities lawyer. And when I met Pro-
fessor Bromberg, I found him as delightful personally as he was knowl-
edgeable about corporate/securities law.
In the Professor's erudite spirit, therefore, I offer these comments that
may be helpful to the development of corporate law in our era of global
engagement. China, the country with the world's largest population, 3 has
* Daniel J. Morrissey is a professor and former Dean at Gonzaga University Law
School.
The author would like to thank colleagues Scott Burnham, Upendra Acharya, Ann Mur-
phy, Xinjuan Zhang (Visiting from Beijing University), and Ashley Sundin and his son
Graham Morrissey for their comments and help in preparing this article. He would also
like to acknowledge the fine research assistance by Gonzaga Law students Alex Biel and
Mike Antler and much needed technical help by Tricia Leahy-Charles. The article is dedi-
cated to the next generation of Morrissey lawyers, the author's nephews Matt, Jim, and
Pat. E-mail address: dmorrissey@lawschool.gonzaga.edu.
1. Strangely neither Deng nor Coolidge may have actually made those statements,
which became emblematic of the eras in which they governed their countries. See Eoin
O'Carroll, Political Misquotes: The 10 Most Famous Things Never Actually Said, CS-
MONITOR (June 3, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2011/0603/Political-mis
quotes-The-10-most-famous-things-never-actually-said/l-can-see-Russia-from-my-house!-
Sarah-Palin; The Famous Quotations and Phrases Linked to Each Day of the Year (Jan. 17,
2014), http://www.thisdayinquotes.com/2010/01/business-of-america-is-business.html.
2. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
3. China's population as of July 1, 2014, was estimated to be nearly 1.4 billion, almost
20% of the people living on earth. Population of China, WORLDOMETERS, (2014), http://
www.worldometers.info/world-population/china-population/.
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undergone a remarkable transformation in the last several decades. Its
economic growth has been so phenomenal that its Gross Domestic Prod-
uct may soon surpass that of the United States.
4
China is now organizing and running much of this extraordinary busi-
ness development through joint-stock companies, its version of corpora-
tions. 5 That legal entity has long been the prime engine for the
production and distribution of wealth in the United States. Yet in our
country large corporations may not now be serving these two significant
public needs. Many believe they are failing to adequately protect their
investors6 and are also doing a poor job in ensuring that the riches they
generate are fairly shared.7
Is the emerging legal regime in China then shaping up to better further
those important goals? Or is it still inferior to what America has learned
about regulating its large enterprises? If the answer to both questions is
uncertain, what then can China and America learn from each other to
develop better forms of corporate governance? Such a shared under-
standing could not only safeguard the interests of the investors in those
companies but also promote more socially responsible businesses.
In homage to Professor Bromberg, this Article will address those is-
sues. To do so, it will first describe the groundbreaking social and political
changes that China has undergone during the last half century. It will
then discuss segments of the corporate and securities laws that China has
enacted during the last several decades to support its prodigious indus-
trial growth. It will also offer some context there with remarks about his-
torical and cultural antecedents of China's new approach.
The Article will sum all that up with some comments comparing the
structure and operation of Chinese and American corporate law. It will
then conclude by offering thoughts on where the two systems might con-
verge to better foster the interests of their investors and the public at
large. 8
II. TO GET RICH IS GLORIOUS
The renowned historian and journalist Theodore H. White covered
China during its war with Japan and wrote this description in 1946 of the
four hundred million individuals there at that time: "Almost all of these
people live by working the soil; the most important single fact about
4. What China Wants, THE ECONOMI ST, Aug. 23, 2014, at 9.
5. JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK 814 (2014).
6. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
8. One pundit recently listed these strong ties between the two nations: "the $600
billion in annual bilateral trade; the 275,000 Chinese studying in America, and the 25,000
Americans studying in China; the fact that China is now America's largest agricultural
market and the largest foreign holder of U.S. debt; and the fact that last year Chinese
investment in the United States for the first time exceeded American investment in
China." Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., What's Up with You?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2015, at
A25.
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China is that it is a land of peasants, a nation of toiling, weather-worn
men and women who work in the fields each day from dawn to dusk." 9
He also said this about their historic role in the country's social order:
"Upon this base rested the thinnest conceivable superstructure of a lei-
sure class that profited by the peasants' toil and preserved for posterity
the learning and graces it had inherited from antiquity."' 0
All that would soon change, however, when Mao Zedong's communist
revolution took power in 1949. Since Mao's success was attributable in
large part to his strong support among the oppressed peasants, his gov-
ernment immediately embarked on an aggressive program of land re-
form.11 The country was now called "The People's Republic of China"
(PRC), and Mao also changed it dramatically with a Soviet style system
of central planning. 12 Yet his radical social and economic experiments,
The Great Leap Forward 13 and The Cultural Revolution, 14 not only
caused widespread suffering, but also devastated the country.15
After Mao's death, his successor Deng Xiaoping turned all that around
by inaugurating a new system that would be called "a socialist market
economy with Chinese characteristics. 1 16 It began in the rural areas in the
late 1970s where farmers were allowed to sell some of their surplus and
keep the revenue. As described by one observer, that "unleashed unprec-
edented agricultural growth, created markets, and unlocked considerable
social mobility. ' 17 Another part of Deng's push for prosperity was to
limit the birth rate by "an often brutally enforced policy to limit child-
9. THEODORE H. WHITE & ANNALEE JACOBY, THUNDER OUT OF CHINA 20-21(1946).
10. Id.
11. JOE STUDWELL, How ASIA WORKS 19-20 (2013).
12. Kan Zhang, Corporate Governance in China: How Does the State Influence its own
Enterprises, 9 BYU INT'L & MGMT. REV. 111 (2013).
13. Much of the progress in agricultural productivity gained in land reform was lost
during this time in the late 1950s when farms were forced to collectivize. The disruption to
agricultural outputs combined with forced industrialization may have accounted for 30/40
million deaths, almost 10% of China population. STUDWELL, supra note 11, at 21.
14. For an interesting perspective on this tumultuous time that is surprising sympa-
thetic to Mao's zealous attempts to remake China into a truly egalitarian society, see
HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA (2011).
15. As one commentator described this mammoth social experience, "Mao dismantled
four million private businesses, nationalized assets, and flattened society so thoroughly that
China's income inequality fell to the lowest level in the socialist world." EVAN OSNOS, AGE
OF AMBITION, CHASING FORTUNE, TRUTH, AND FAITH IN THE NEW CHINA 60 (2014).
All that was in pursuit of what one commentator called, "the dream of the beautiful
collective.... People would liberate themselves from religion, hierarchy and oppression.
They would build a new kind of society where equality would be the rule, where rational
planning would replace cruel competition." David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Spiritual Reces-
sion, INT'L N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2014, at A29.
The political reality in the United States today appears to be just the opposite. Every
leading political candidate seems to share a view held by the wealthy that government
action is not a good way to deal with increasing income inequality. Noam Scheiber, 16
Hopefuls and Wealthy are Aligned on Inequality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2015, at B1.
16. Clyde D. Stoltenberg, Globalization, "Asian Values," and Economic Reform: The
Impact of Tradition and Change on Ethical Values in Chinese Business, 33 CORNELL INT'L
L. J. 711, 722 (2000).




In addition, Deng, a longtime Communist operative, had come to be-
lieve that the government-run enterprises dominating the nation were
overly bureaucratic and inefficient. If state power there was reduced and
at least part of the economy was allowed to serve the market, he rea-
soned, that would force China's government-operated businesses to be-
come competitive. 19
Deng also realized that any country committed to development had to
engage in international trade.20 He therefore supported China's bur-
geoning manufacturing sector with subsidies and various protective mea-
sures until it became successful in the world market.21 As Evan Osnos
notes when he discusses the forces that drove this remarkable transfor-
mation, "China's extraordinary growth relied on a combination of abun-
dant cheap labor and a surge of investments in factories and
infrastructure-a recipe that uncorked economic energy stored up during
the years of turmoil under Mao."
'22
Soon the country was experiencing growth rates of almost ten percent
per year 23 with a corresponding explosion in its GDP.24 As one observer
summed it up, "economic reform in China has transformed a poverty-
ridden, poorly educated nation into a great power that is playing an in-
creasingly pivotal role in the globalized world."
2 5
Deng's economic miracle was supported by legal reforms that began in
the late 1970s legitimating contract and property rights.26 The ensuing
individualism was a huge alteration of the collectivist mentality promul-
gated by Mao, but Deng justified it by saying, "[l]et some people get rich
18. Id. at xxiii.
19. Stoltenberg, supra note 16, at 722.
20. SWTDWELL, supra note 11, at xx.
21. Id. at 75.
22. OSNOS, supra note 15, at 39. Joshua Cooper Ramo describes the constant change
he observed in China as Time's foreign editor: "It was a sense you could also find in many
people I knew in China as they struggled to build an economic and political order against
the unpredictable demands of constant newness. Change is at the center of all their lives.
They seek it out and, when change is proceeding too slowly, accelerate it. They operate
with the self-regard and courage of people who believe that the tide of history is on their
side, bringing us closer to whatever dream they find most exciting whether it is fast univer-
sal connections to data or wholly new types of government." JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE
AGE OF THE UNTHINKABLE 5 (2009).
23. Carsten A. Holtz, China's Economic Growth 1978-2025: What We Know Today
about China's Economic Growth Tomorrow, 36 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1665-91 (2008).
During this time, China made great progress in reducing hunger and poverty. Zhang
Rui, U.N. China has Big Role to Play in Fighting Hunger, CHINA.ORG.CN (Jul. 11, 2014),
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-09/12/content_ 30 007571.htm.
24. JOHN W. HEAD, CHINA'S LEGAL SOUL 86 (2009).
25. Mickiko Kakutani, An Insider Views China, Past and Future, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
2011, at C1.
26. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 5, at 805.
One commentator described these reforms as a "dynamic, ongoing process ... support-
ing a transition to a socialist market economy." Stoltenberg, supra note 16, at 724. They
were part of a legislative process in China that one observer has called "an area of frenzied
activity." HEAD, supra note 24, at 87.
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first and gradually the people should get rich together. '27 The ensuing
materialism not only brought with it "troublesome tensions and contra-
dictions" in traditional Chinese culture, but also did much to "sap the
moral underpinnings of state power."'28
Yet there never was, and never has been, a parallel political liberaliza-
tion in modern China. Deng could never let go of his authoritarian beliefs
so that "even with economic reform and a [resulting] wealthier society,
China would have to be ruled solely by the [Chinese Communist
Party]. '29 He therefore came down hard on the 1989 democratic uprising
in Tiananmen Square, and to this day the Communist party still retains a
monopoly on power that controls the country's legal system. For instance,
while reformers talk about developing a "rule of law,"' 30 the party must
still approve all judges. 31
The state, in addition, continues to hold major ownership interests in
many businesses and controls outright some industries that the party
deems essential to Chinese national interests, such as energy, banking,
and transportation. 32 The market value of these centrally owned enter-
prises still comprises a good portion of the worth of all listed companies
27. OSNOS, supra note 15, at 14.
Osnos also describes what has happened since Deng made that decision: "For some of its
citizens, China's boom has created stupendous fortune: China is the world's fastest growing
source of new billionaires. Several of the new plutocrats have been among the world's most
dedicated thieves; others have been holders of high public office... For most of the Chi-
nese people, however, the boom has not produced vast wealth; it has permitted the first
halting steps out of poverty ... In 1978 the average Chinese income was $200; by 2014, it
was $6,000." Id. at 4.
28. Stoltenberg, supra note 16, at 723.
For instance, China's current leader, Xi Jinping, while a provincial administrator pro-
moted free enterprise but had to assuage the misgivings of old-line communists with state-
ments like, "[t]he private economy has become an exotic flower in the garden of socialism
with Chinese characteristics." Evan Osnos, Born Red, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 6, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red.
29. Stoltenberg, supra note 16, at 722.
Deng, some say, was following the distinctly Asian wisdom of Lee Kuan Yew who took
the impoverished city-state of Singapore and made it an exemplar of prosperity. His anti-
democratic approach to economic development was said to have greatly influenced the
elite of Beijing. Orville Schell, The Man who Remade Asia, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28-29, 2015,
at C5.
30. As Professor Head sums this up: "Many observers, inside and outside China alike,
would regard the rule of law in that country to be immature or rudimentary or fragile."
HEAD, supra note 24, at 188.
31. Li Hui & Megha Rajagopalan, China Aims to Revamp Justice System but Commu-
nist Party to Retain Control, REUTERS, June 16, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/
06/16/us-china-justice-revamp-idUSKBNOERORR20140616.
In addition, the current investigations into corruption involving Chinese government and
business officials appear to be full of human rights abuses. Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buck-
ley, Presumed Guilty in China's War on Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2014, at Al. It
may be that in a country where the state is dominant, honest business people have no
choice but to cultivate connections with Communist leaders, leaving them open to bribery
charges. Editorial, China's Unhappy Rich, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2014. Such practices as
using "unofficial channels" or "going through the back door" have a long history in China.
See also Stoltenberg, supra note 16.
32. Zhang, supra note 12, at 120-21.
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in China, and they account for a large majority of their profits.33 While
the investing public holds shares in some of these firms, it is fair to say
that "the Chinese government . . . is an 800 pound gorilla . . . in the
Chinese securities market." 34
III. CHINESE CORPORATE LAW
Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s many non-government owned enter-
prises answering to the market were replacing debt-ridden and poorly run
state-owned enterprises. 35 Correspondingly, stock exchanges grew up in
Shanghai and Shenzhen in the early 1990s. 36 The existence of those capi-
tal markets accelerated the privatization of some state owned businesses,
which were then put into the corporate form. The same momentum also
led the enterprises that continued to be controlled by the state to assume
corporate status.
A major development supporting that trend was the enactment of the
first Company Law in 1993, amended most recently in 2005. 37 It created a
legal structure for the establishment of "companies limited by shares,"
also called "joint stock companies."' 38 In many ways those entities were
designed similarly to U.S. corporations. They could have an unlimited
number of shareholders who would be liable only for corporate debts up
to the amounts they invested. 39
Internal and external pressures led to rapid development of this new
Chinese corporate model. The country's exponential growth rate pushed
its businesses into an operating mode that was quite different from the
old state run enterprises-driving trends toward both transparency and
33. These and many other companies continue to be directly and indirectly subsidized
by the government, MICHAEL E. BURKE, CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO DOING Busi-
NESS IN CHINA, § 1.8 (2012).
Matthew Weinstein, The Independent Director Requirement and its Effects on the For-
eign Investment Climate in China: Progress or Regress, 4 Bus. L. BRIEF (AM. U.) 35, 35
(2008).
34. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The state is the dominant shareholder of
almost two-thirds of the listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.
Yu-Hsin Lin, Do Social Ties Matter in Corporate Governance? The Missing Factor in Chi-
nese Corporate Governance Reform, 5 GEO. MASON J. INT'L COM. L. 39, 67 (2013).
This dominance may be even more pronounced today as the current General Secretary
of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping, has consolidated his power. As a recent pro-
file of Xi puts it, "he holds ultimate authority over every general, judge, editor, and state-
company CEO." Osnos, supra note 28.
35. See Rebecca Lee, Fiduciary Duties without Equity: "Fiduciary Duties" of Directors
under the Revised Company Law of the PRC, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 897, 898 (2007).
36. Zhang, supra note 12, at 113.
37. Company Law of the PRC (Presidential Order No. 42) (1993) revised by, inter
alia, the 18th Session of Standing Committee of the 10th National People's Congress on
Oct. 27, 2005.
Michael D. Greenberg, Yong Kang, & Elizabeth D. Brown, Corporate Governance in
China: A Tale of Rapid Change, CORP. FINANCE REV., Mar./Apr. 2009, 2009 WL 9420845;
see also Zhang supra note 12, at 112.
38. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 5, at 814.
39. Company Law of the PRC, arts. 81, 126.
A corollary provision of U.S. corporate law providing limited liability for shareholders is
Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.22.
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efficiency. 40 In addition, the country's acceptance into the World Trade
Organization gave the PRC what one commentator called "no choice but
to standardize its enterprise practice and . . bring competitive mecha-
nisms of the modem corporation into its enterprises.1
41
China thus borrowed many of its "standards and mechanisms for gov-
ernance, finance, and securities regulation ... from, the larger interna-
tional community. '4 2 From the German model, it adopted a two-tier
board of directors-one consisting of a supervisory group representing
the interests of shareholders and workers and the second charged with
actually running the company.43 Ranking in theory over both of them as
the company's ultimate authority is the shareholders' meeting/assembly.
The Company Act gives this annual gathering of stockholders plenary
power over key issues of the firm's business operations and policies. 44
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF CHINESE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
Corporate power in the United States has passed historically from
shareholders, to directors, and then to an oligarchy of self-perpetuating
managers.45 Much of the story of American corporate law from that time
on has thus been the development of fiduciary duties46 and disclosure
obligations4 7 to guard against members of this ruling executive class en-
riching themselves at the expense of the shareholders. Yet the success of
those measures has been problematic. 48 A succession of scandals involv-
ing various wrongful conduct by American businesses49 has shown their
deficiencies and resulted in further legislation to guard against such
40. Zhang, supra note 12, at 114.
41. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Greenberg et al., supra note 37.
43. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 5, at 820-23.
44. Company Law of the PRC, arts. 38 and 103.
45. An influential study described this phenomenon in detail. ADOLF BERLE & GAR-
DINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
46. This was accomplished in large part by case law coming from the leading American
jurisdiction for corporate law, Delaware. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del.
1939); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
47. Most influential here were the federal securities laws, The Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. and The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. The
former set up a regime for regulating the sale of securities by compelling the disclosure of
all material facts of the offering. The latter was designed to compel subsequent disclosures
by those public companies to safeguard the value of their securities and the markets where
they were traded.
48. In discussing China's evolving efforts to enhance investor protection, an article
skeptically compared them to the American model with this unfavorable comment: "It is
fascinating to observe China seeking to achieve these aims at a time when American (and
European) models for corporate governance institutions have, in some basic respects, sys-
tematically failed." Greenberg et al., supra note 37, at 2.
49. For a good discussion of the continuing wrongdoings that have rocked American
business, see M. Thomas Arnold, It's Ddjd vu All Over Again: Using Bounty Hunters to
Leverage Gatekeeper Duties, 45 TULSA L. REV. 419 (2010).
One of the most egregious of these was the pervasive practice of options back-dating at





China's initial Company Act, by contrast, lacked any explicit provision
imposing fiduciary duties 51 beyond a vague requirement that directors
"perform their duties faithfully. '52 While that might imply that directors
had to act honestly and in good faith, the directors' broader responsibility
to protect the interests of shareholders was ill defined, probably because
it was a novel idea in China that corporate management had such a role. 53
Several reasons may account for that.
Due to the influence of continental European powers in the 19th cen-
tury, such as France and Germany,54 Chinese law is rooted in the civil law
tradition. The concept of fiduciary duties, however, arises from the En-
glish equity system of jurisprudence, which can mean that Chinese judges
will not have the legal tools to deal with issues like self-dealing. 55
In addition, despite the privatization of much of the economy, the state
continues to dominate and own majority share interests in a large number
of important listed companies. As one commentator pointed out, given
China's longstanding tradition of corruption,5 6 this was not a positive sit-
uation for ethical governance. Rent seeking behavior and insider trading
were obvious consequences that negatively impacted the minority public
shareholders. 57
Nevertheless, much as the passage of the federal securities laws in the
1930s pushed American corporate law in a new direction,58 the develop-
ment of the same legal structure in China greatly enhanced the fiduciary
Exorbitant executive compensation, the norm now in many U.S. firms, is another exam-
ple of American corporate officers and directors enriching themselves at the expense of
their shareholders. For the author's views, see Daniel J. Morrissey, Executive Compensa-
tion and Income Inequality, 4 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 1 (2013). In addition, there
continues to be a large number of financial frauds in American companies. See MARK S.
BEASLEY ET AL., FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING, 1998-2007: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S
PUBLIC COMPANIES (2010).
In very recent memory, too, is the financial meltdown that followed huge amounts of
credit extended based on shaky mortgages. Massive frauds were committed there on inno-
cent investors and a great recession ensued. See generally Paul M. Barrett, Rational Irra-
tionality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2009, at BR18.
50. In recent times the chief pieces of such financial legislation have been the Sarbanes
Oxley Act, Pub. L. 116-745 (2002) and the Dodd-Frank Wall St. Reform and Investor Pro-
tection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, H.R. 4713 (2010).
51. Norma Calcina Howson, "Quack Corporate Governance" as Traditional Chinese
Medicine-The Securities Regulation Cannibalization of China's Corporate Law and a State
Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, 37 SEATrLE U. L. REV.
667, 677-78 (2014).
52. Lee, supra note 35, at 989-99 (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Greenberg, supra note 36, at 4.
54. Franck Chantayan, An Examination of American and German Corporate Law
Norms, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT., 431, 433-34.
55. Lee, supra note 35, at 989-99.
56. "[I]t is no exaggeration to comment that the Chinese government functioned as a
mechanism of inbuilt corruption." Stoltenberg, supra note 16, at 721.
For a discussion of the contemporary prosecution of this corruption by China's current
leadership, see supra note 30.
57. Greenberg et al., supra note 37, at 4.
58. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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duties of the Company Act. The PRC enacted its Securities Law in 1998
and, at the same time, the State Council set up a ministry-level agency,
the Chinese Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The CSRC's man-
date is to regulate and enforce all securities-related policies.59 The CSCR
thus has far-reaching responsibilities that in many ways parallel and even
exceed those of its U.S. counterpart, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC). 60
The CSRC was in turn partially responsible for promulgating an influ-
ential Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in 2001 that
set the basic structure for regulation of those companies. It requires that
those firms "must be operated in an independent manner and prescribes
the minimum disclosure regarding their governance."'61 Under its rules,
listed companies must have at least two independent directors, and their
boards must consist of at least one-third such members who have fiduci-
ary duties to the shareholders. 62
While this in theory may be a positive step toward better corporate
governance, it has some real flaws in practice. 63 First, the dominance of
the state in many corporations means that boards will be beholden to that
one significant power. 64 Beyond that, "independent" in Chinese corpo-
rate law is a vague word; American listing authorities, by contrast, define
it with much greater specificity-in terms of employment, familial, and
business relationships. 65 Exacerbating that situation is the Chinese tradi-
tion, which makes such personal and social ties of paramount importance
in human relations, compromising the monitoring function that directors
are supposed to play.66 Many board members therefore function as so-
called "favor" 67 or "vase"68 directors, a term used to indicate that the
positions of these supposedly independent officials are merely decorative.
Adding to this perceived ineffectiveness is the paucity of independent
directors required-at most one-third of the board. That is in sharp con-
59. Howson, supra note 51, at 697. The author there states that the CSRC is the only
governmental body in China's "fragmented authoritarianism" that is capable of "seeing to
the institution of corporate governance norms to protect minority shareholders against ex-
ploitation by state controlling shareholders." Id. at 697, 710.
60. For a lengthy discussion of the broad powers that the CSRC has in overseeing
public stock offerings, see ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 810-11. For instance, the CRSC
has power to control the price of a public stock offering whereas the SEC's only mandate is
to compel full disclosure of all relevant facts of an offering. This author's opinion is that the
SEC's power is inadequate in that regard. Daniel J. Morrissey, The Securities Act at its
Diamond Jubilee: Renewing the Case for a Robust Registration Requirement, 11 U. PA. J.
Bus. L. 749 (2009).
61. Zhang, supra note 12, at 116.
62. Jie Yuan, Formal Convergence or Substantial Divergence? Evidence from Adop-
tion of the Independent Directors in China, 9 ASIAN-PAcIFIC L. & POL'Y J. 71, 74 (2007).
63. Weinstein, supra note 33, at 37.
64. Yuan, supra note 62, at 77-78.
65. See Yuan, supra note 62, at 82 (detailing how the norms of independent director in
China are merely geared to preventing a firm's large shareholders from serving in that
capacity while in the U.S. such restrictions are broader); see also Lin, supra note 35, at 42.
66. Lin, supra note 34, at 42-43.
67. Id. at 68-69.
68. Yuan, supra note 62, at 90.
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trast to the U.S. practice where independent directors must at least com-
prise a majority of those members.69 Even beyond that, there is a lack of
qualified candidates for these positions who have real knowledge about
how to run a company. As a result, independent directors tend to remain
passive, which only reinforces the common understanding that they are
ineffective.70
Yet Chinese corporate law continues to make improvements in fleshing
out the fiduciary duties of directors. The Company Law revisions in 2005
introduced the obligation of loyalty and described a number of actions
that it would forbid, such as bribery, misappropriation of company funds,
and usurpation of business opportunities. It also contained specific and
detailed provisions against self-dealing. 71 The New Act, in addition,
strengthened the rights of shareholders by giving them many rights that
are parallel to those enjoyed in U.S. corporate codes. They included cu-
mulative voting, access to information, 72 and even the ability to bring an
action akin to U.S. derivative suits.73
All such rights, however, are statutory, as would be expected in a re-
gime that traces its roots to the civil law tradition.74 One therefore might
question how they'd be enforced outside the flexible Anglo-American
tradition of equity, where fiduciary duties were originally developed and
nurtured.75 Yet beyond that, an even more serious question remains.
How can shareholders realistically assert such rights in a legal system of
questionable independence and integrity 76 where the state dominates
many large companies? 77
V. THE BROADER ISSUE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
An even more fundamental problem exists for Chinese as well as
American corporate law. The larger obligations that business owes to so-
ciety is a subject that has been debated in U.S. law since at least the
landmark case of Dodge v. Ford,78 where the Court turned aside Henry
Ford's contention that his hugely profitable motor company had wider
duties than just making profit for its shareholders. 79
Despite that precedent, the push for greater corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR) has been gaining momentum in the United States for at least
69. Id. at 80.
70. Id. at 88-90.
71. Lee, supra note 35, at 903-07, 913-14.
72. Id. at 902.
73. Company Law art. 153.
74. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
75. Lee, supra note 35, at 909-11.
76. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
78. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
79. "A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of directors are to be employed for that end." Id. at 684.
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a quarter of a century.8 0 It is being pursued with more fervor than ever
because of alarming income inequality 81 and wealth disparity,82 both of
which exist in the United States, China, and globally.8 3 Environmental
degradation by corporations is also fueling that drive 84 with world leaders
like Pope Francis condemning those trends.8 5
In some ways, modem China is doing better there than former Com-
munist countries and other developing nations. The economic reforms be-
gun by Deng have substantially alleviated poverty in China.86 In addition,
"China has a more progressive income tax than Russia which it has in-
vested in education, health, and infrastructure on a far larger scale than
• .. other emerging countries such as India which China has clearly out-
distance. ' 87 Yet the gap between the country's wealthy elite and its other
citizens is no less than in the United States.88 Still, there may be hope that
China can evolve toward a society where its riches are more fairly shared
among all its citizens, particularly those who participate in their creation.
For one thing, the Confucian ethical tradition, while hostile to law as an
ineffective way to regulate human activity, promoted a highly others-cen-
tered code of behavior.89 In its revised "neo" or "new" form that arose
80. See Daniel J. Morrissey, The Riddle of Shareholder Rights and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 80 BROOKLYN L. REV. 353, 379-93 (2015).
81. A series of articles and media presentations have graphically brought this to light.
Among the best are Joseph E. Stiglitz, Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%, Vanity Fair (May
2011), and a recent movie produced by the former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, Ine-
quality for All, (72 Productions 2013) reviewed in Chasm Between the Very Rich and Every-
body Else, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2013, at C16.
82. Neil Shah, Wealth Gap between America's Rich and Middle-Class Families Widest
on Record, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/12/17/wealth-
gap-between-americas-rich-and-middle-class-families-widest-on-record/. The article re-
ports that while the country's economy has come back from the Great Recession, the divi-
sion between the very rich and everyone else has widened. Upper income families now
have wealth that is almost 70 times that of low income households.
83. The definitive study on this is THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2014).
84. The United Nations has held periodic conferences on this pressing problem, the
most recent on Climate Change in New York City in September, 2014. There President
Obama urged China to join the United States, as the world's two largest polluters, to to-
gether reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Mark Landler & Coral Davenport, Obama
Presses Chinese to Move to Curb Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2014, at Al.
Shortly thereafter at a summit meeting in November, 2014 the two countries did just
that. Obama announced a target to cut U.S. emissions by 26 to 28% and the Chinese leader
Xi Jinping pledged to cap China's carbon emissions by 2030. David Nakamura & Steven
Mufson, China, U.S. Agree to Limit Greenhouse Gases, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 12, 2014.
China had made earlier commitments to U.N. sponsored policies for a sustainable envi-
ronment. Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Window Dressing or Struc-
tural Change?, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 64, 88 (2010).
85. Francis X. Rocca, The New Rome, WALL ST. J., Sat.-Sun., Apr. 4-5, 2015 at C1.
86. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
87. PIKErTY, supra note 83, at 536.
88. The International Monetary Fund has just reported that China is one of the most
unequal countries in the world. The top quintile makes nearly half the income while the
bottom quintile gets less than 5%. Ian Talley, China is one of the Most Unequal Countries
in the World, IMF Paper Says, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/
2015/03/26/china-is-one-of-most-unequal-countries-in-the-world-imf-paper-says/.
89. HEAD, supra note 24, at 8-15. A contrary tradition, however, emerged in China
several centuries later led by a group called the "Legalists." They held that punishment was
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during the 20th century, Confucianism shed its aristocratic background
and advocated an egalitarian humanism.90
And even though the Confucian outlook had disdain for business, it
and the communal spirit of Chinese society historically urged mercantile
and other profit making enterprises to think beyond the selfish interests
of their owners to the concerns of the larger society. That altruistic atti-
tude was reinforced not only by indigenous religions, such as Zen Bud-
dhism and Daoism, but also by imperial decrees, such as one in 1731
urging relief and aid to the poor.91 A similar biblical-based morality once
served perhaps to underpin democratic capitalism in the United States.
92
Mao's revolution, moreover, was specifically supported by an alliance
of workers and peasants, and to this day, China's constitution speaks of
its foundational philosophy of socialism.93 In line with that, the most re-
cent version of its Company Law explicitly recognizes the importance of
corporate social responsibility, which apparently came about because of
the forceful advocacy of many delegates to the National People's Con-
gress that enacted the current provisions.94
In addition, the dual board structure that China borrowed from Ger-
many has the potential to create a more equitable distribution of the
wealth created by its companies. As has been noted,95 China's Company
Law requires two groups of directors, one that is responsible for running
the company and another, a supervisory committee, to represent the in-
terests of shareholders and employees. 96 Because civil law countries do
not have the equitable tradition of Anglo-American jurisprudence that
directly imposes fiduciary duties on directors, the supervisory board is
supposed to serve that function by monitoring the regular directors' du-
ties of loyalty.97
Yet this upper-level board is also there, at least in theory, to represent
the interests of workers. Some commentators say that German supervi-
sory boards do a poor job of fulfilling that responsibility because they are
dominated by representatives of a few large banks98 who outvote the
members elected by labor.99 Yet another respected observer of interna-
tional labor relations offers a more sanguine appraisal of the impact of
an appropriate way to deter wrongful conduct and urged "a rule of law was superior to a
rule of men." Id. at 17-18.
90. Id. at 166-78.
91. Lin, supra note 84, at 85.
92. Brooks, supra note 15.
93. Lin, supra note 84, at 68.
94. Id. at 71.
95. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
96. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 5, at 822.
97. Lee, supra note 35, at 905-07.
One commentator, however, has called the Chinese supervisory board a "tiger without
teeth" because it lacks power to effectively discipline boards and its members, therefore,
tend to shirk their responsibilities. Yuan, supra note 62, at 79.
98. Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance: A
Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL. L. REv. 1819, 1822 (1996).
99. Id. at 1826-27; Chantayan, supra note 54, at 442.
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those directors. Citing a recent study that found that the hourly wages
and benefits of German auto workers is $66 while that of their U.S. coun-
terparts is only $33, he asks, "[h]ow can German workers be getting so
much more? . . . It's ... because they're directors of these companies.
Because of the work councils and co-determined boards, they have real
positions of power." 100 Similar authority may then lie in the Chinese su-
pervisory boards as well to compel companies there to treat their labor
forces fairly.
Another factor that may advance that cause is the action of the work-
ers themselves. Sweatshop conditions persist, 101 but resistance is mount-
ing. In a country where all unions are state-controlled, much of this is
coming from the bottom up.' 02 In 2014 the number of strikes and labor
protests in China doubled to more than 1,300, and workers were able to
use these strikes to win some concessions.' 0 3 In similar fashion, spontane-
ous rallies are occurring among American workers to demand better
pay.104
VI. CONCLUSION
China and America are the two powerhouses of the global economy,
and their relationship is of supreme importance in world affairs.' 0 5 Both
countries, however, have serious shortcomings in their regimes of corpo-
rate governance. These can be overcome, as this Article has argued, by
proactive courts and legislatures that understand how important the rule
of law is to promote investor confidence. As the U.S. Supreme Court put
it, "a dynamic, free economy presupposes a high degree of integrity in all
of its parts, an integrity that must be underwritten by rules enforceable in
fair, independent, accessible courts."'10 6
It is also crucial that the large enterprises of both nations be committed
to serving not just their shareholders, but also the larger interests of their
societies. Right now both the United States and China, for all the wealth
they produce, are fast becoming plutocracies where the great majority of
their citizens will be impoverished. The difference now is that in China,
100. THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, ONLY ONE THING CAN SAVE Us 20-21 (2014).
101. Among the most notorious are those involving the 120,000 workers at the Foxconn
factory in Chengdu where workers are paid low wages, work excessive overtime, and live
in crowded dorms making parts for iPads and other Apple products. Charles Duhigg &
David Barboza, In China, the Human Costs That Are Built Into an iPad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 2012, at Al.
A more recent article described Chinese teens who work 12-hour days for little pay
putting together electronic devices for some of the world's largest brands: Eva Dou,
China's Tech Factories Turn to Student Labor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2014.
102. Han Yan Yuan, Protests, Suicide: China Labor Unrest Leads to Reform, CNN,
Sept. 5, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/05/world/asia/china-labor-union-reforml.
103. Out Brothers, Out!, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 2015.
104. Steven Greenhouse, Movement to Increase McDonald's Minimum Wage Broadens
its Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2015.
105. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Rules for Dealing with a Rising China, WALL ST. J., Apr.
11-12, 2015, at C3.
106. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161 (2008).
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the lion's share of the wealth generated goes to the dominate shareholder
of its industries, the state, whereas in the United States, it is taken by a
small group of the super-rich. 10 7
Unless the leaders of both countries pay more attention to what
Thomas Piketty calls "the interests of the least well off,"110 8 there may be
dire consequences. Without concerted action, one commentator has pre-
dicted that China will have another revolution in fifteen years'0 9 and a
like deterioration of American society may occur. There are, however,
solutions to those critical problems within the legal and cultural traditions
of the two countries. By drawing on those and sharing that learning with
each other, both nations can find the resolve to address these injustices
and bring humankind to a better future.
Addendum:
As this Article was being sent to print, events called into question the
stability of China's new-found prosperity. The country's stock markets
declined precipitously in late summer, 2015 and the government's ill-ad-
vised attempt to prop them up only further eroded global confidence in
China's economic future. That sent world markets crashing and perhaps
called into question the stability of the country's leadership. In addition,
the negative reaction to China's trading practices fomented by American
politicians like Donald Trump highlighted the uncertain relationship of
the world's two economic superpowers. All that activity, however, may
just be a correction to China's temporarily unsustainable pattern of rapid
growth. One may hope it will not be a permanent setback to the progress
that this Article envisions in a partnership between China and the United
States committed to human rights and a more equitable distribution of
the world's wealth.
107. The author has written of this as it relates to excessive executive compensation.
Daniel J. Morrissey, Executive Compensation and Income Inequality, 4 WM. & MARY Bus.
L. REV. 1 (2013).
108. PIKE='I, supra note 83, at 575.
109. Osnos, supra note 28, at 54-55.
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